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THE CAUSALITY OF SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS: 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE US, JAPAN AND EUROPE 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
This study examines the 'logic' or underlying causality of supply relationships. It develops 
and tests hypotheses, in a LISREL model, on detailed data for 553, 450 and 226 supply 
relationships in the US, Japanese and European automobile industries. The differences found 
between the three regions seem small, given the received view that there are fundamental 
differences between 'Japanese' and 'Western' contracting. However, the differences that 
remain suggest that in the US perhaps the 'Japanese system' has been surpassed, in a 'third 
way' that combines the advantages of sufficiently durable relations with the advantages of an 
open system with great variety. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, many Western automobile producers have changed their 
traditional arm's-length supply relationships –characterised by discrete transactions and short-
term relationships– towards more commitment, in more durable relationships (Sako 1992, 
Helper 1994). This trend was inspired by Japanese achievements. It has been widely 
acknowledged that Japanese relationships of producers with main suppliers played a key role 
in the competitive advantage of Japanese automobile producers (Cusumano 1985, Womack 
et. al. 1990, Nishiguchi 1994). The present study seeks to understand and assess these 
developments. What are the underlying variables and their connections that drive these 
relationships? How do these differ between the US, Japan and Europe? 
 The analysis is conducted on the basis of a combination of perspectives: 
- A theory of learning and innovation for insight in competence creation 
- Transaction cost economics (TCE) for insight in issues of governance  
- Social exchange theory for insight in commitment next to opportunism. 
Williamson (1999) pleaded for the building of bridges between the competence and 
governance perspectives. We aim to contribute to that. The competence perspective tends to 
neglect issues of relational risk, while the governance perspective has neglected the dynamics 
of relations: the development of new competencies, insight in the motives of partners, and 
trust. From the competence perspective, we regard supply relationships as a means to utilise 
complementary competencies between buyers and suppliers and to develop new 
competencies. From the governance perspective of transaction cost theory we consider the 
governance of 'relational risk'. Next to the usual forms of 'specific' or 'dedicated' investment 
included in TCE, we suggest that building competencies and trust entails specific investments 
in mutual understanding and co-operation. In contrast with transaction cost economics, we 
include commitment and trust next to opportunism. TCE assumes that one cannot have 
reliable information on a partner's trustworthiness, but when we take relational dynamics and 
learning into account a basis for trust and commitment may emerge. 
 This combination of perspectives, based on earlier work of the authors, yields a set of 
hypotheses concerning variables that drive collaborative supply relationships and the causal 
relations between them. Many firm- and relation-specific characteristics are at play. For the 
identification and specification of those variables we build on a variety of earlier empirical 
studies from the literature (e.g. Monteverde and Teece 1982, Walker and Weber 1984, Levy 
1984, Balakrishnan and Weber 1984, Anderson 1985, 1994, Dwyer et al. 1987, John and 
Weitz 1988, Heide and John 1988, 1990, 1992, Anderson and Weitz 1989, Achrol 1991, 
Buchanan 1992, Moorman et al. 1992, Parkhe 1993, Heide 1994, Morgan and Hunt 1994, 
Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, Kumar et. al. 1995, 1998, Berger et al. 1995, Geyskens et. al. 
1996, Nooteboom et al. 1997, Noorderhaven et al.1998). 
 What is new here is that we recognise that causal relations between the variables are 
likely to be complex and circular. For example, one of the hypotheses is that dedicated 
investments increase dependence, and hence risk of hold-up. However, they can also increase 
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one's unique value for the partner, thus increasing his dependence, which increases his 
commitment, which reduces hold-up risk. Further examples will emerge from the empirical 
analysis. To test our hypotheses we employ the LISREL methodology, which is an 
appropriate tool to analyse such complex and sometimes circular patterns of causation. 
 A LISREL model is tested on data for 553, 450 and 226 supply relationships in the 
US, Japanese and European automobile industry. Estimates for the three regions are 
compared. We find differences that seem small, relative to the expectation we had on the 
basis of received views on systemic differences between 'Japanese' and 'Western' contracting. 
Several studies have argued that durable supply relationships are a specifically Japanese 
feature. They are supposed to be embedded and developed in a typically Japanese society 
characterised by high levels of trust, and for that reason cannot be established in the typically 
non-co-operative, competitive and low trust Western world of the United States and Europe 
(Hofstede 1980, Dore 1987, Womack et al. 1990, Cusumano and Takeishi 1991, Dyer and 
Ouchi 1993, Lamming 1993, Kamath and Liker 1994). Our results indicate that there has 
been considerable convergence towards a common system. Nevertheless, although there are 
only few remaining differences between the three regions, they seem significant. They 
suggest that in the US perhaps a 'third way' (Nooteboom 1998) has been found which 
combines the advantages of sufficiently durable relations with the advantages of an open 
system with a variety of relations that benefits innovation. 
 The outline of this paper is as follows. The first paragraph provides the theoretical 
basis for the study. The second paragraph specifies the variables of the LISREL model. The 
third paragraph specifies hypotheses. The fourth paragraph describes the data collection. The 
fifth paragraph presents the empirical results. The final paragraph discusses the results, 
limitations and further research. 
 
 
THEORY 
 
Transaction cost theory 
 
 We employ some of the insights of transaction cost economics (TCE), specifically 
from (Williamson 1985). That allows for 'hybrid' forms of governance 'between market and 
hierarchy'. The core insight from TCE is that dedicated investments create dependence, 
resulting in a risk of 'hold-up'. This risk is greater to the extent that there is uncertainty 
concerning motives and conditions of collaboration. Given the hazards of opportunism, this 
risk must be 'governed'. The higher this risk, the more it will require organisational 
integration or bilateral contracting to control it. 
 We take into account that there is widespread dissatisfaction with the transaction cost 
explanation of organisation. Empirical evidence has presented modes of governance, such as 
the ones studied in this article, which could not be assimilated completely into Williamson's 
(1985) framework. Moreover, although transaction cost economics may contribute to the 
explanation of why organisations exist, it has virtually nothing to say about how they work. 
Furthermore, it has little to say about the development of novel competencies. Finally, 
contrary to transaction cost economics (Williamson 1993), trust and loyalty matter. 
Complementary theoretical insights are needed to understand collaboration between firms. 
We incorporate two extensions: the development of competencies and the role of 
commitment. 
 
Competencies 
 
 The first extension draws from Nooteboom's (1992) more dynamic perspective on 
transaction cost theory, which combines competence and governance perspectives. While 
Williamson focuses on static efficiency –efficiency is maximised by trading off production 
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costs, transaction costs and costs of organisation, given a certain state of knowledge, 
technology and preference– Nooteboom employs a perspective of dynamic efficiency or 
innovation, incorporating shifts of knowledge, technology and preferences. 
 The current shift in many industries from 'making' to 'buying' is best explained on the 
basis of dynamic efficiency. In order to be at the forefront of development, and to maintain 
flexibility of configurations of competencies, for the sake of innovation, a producer should 
concentrate on the activities at which he is best, and should outsource the other activities as 
much as strategically possible. Furthermore, in order to reduce development times of new 
products and to reduce risks of maladjustment to customer needs, the supplier should be 
brought in as a partner in developing and launching a new product. Ongoing interaction 
between a customer and a supplier is a necessary condition in order to share and develop 
competencies. 
 The importance of complementary competencies is underpinned by a theory of 
knowledge that suggests that people's perceptions and interpretations are dependent on 
mental frameworks that in turn depend on idiosyncratic experience (Nooteboom 2000). 
Those frameworks constitute 'absorptive capacity' (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). The need to 
create a common focus, in order to achieve common goals, is more fundamental for 
organisations than the need to reduce transaction costs. This is the idea of an organisation as 
a 'sensemaking system' (Weick 1979, 1995), 'system of shared meaning' (Smircich 1983), 
'focusing device' (Nooteboom 1992, 1999), or 'interpretation system' (Choo 1998). However, 
such organisational focus creates a risk of myopia, which needs to be repaired by employing 
complementary cognition from appropriate partners, at a 'cognitive distance' that is 
sufficiently large to yield novel insight and sufficiently small to ensure that it is still 
comprehensible (Nooteboom 1992, 1999, 2000). 
 This yields a prediction that is opposite to a prediction from TCE. According to the 
latter, firms make more, rather than buying, when uncertainty increases, because that makes 
control of hold-up in outside contracting more difficult. According to Nooteboom, when 
uncertainty increases, in the sense that technologies and markets become more complex and 
change becomes faster, firms have a greater need for outside complementary competence, for 
the sake of flexibility and learning. As a result, under higher uncertainty firms use outside 
suppliers more rather than less.   
 Competencies are not off-the-shelf products but are embedded in the heads and hands 
of people, in teams, organisational structure and procedures, and organisational culture. They 
often have a strong tacit dimension. Their development is path-dependent in the sense that 
they are contingent upon preceding firm-specific assets and organisational learning (cf. 
Lippman and Rumelt 1982). In case of tacit knowledge, ongoing interaction is needed to 
enable the transfer of knowledge. The linkage between firms with different complementary 
perspectives and competencies requires appropriate absorptive capacity and a shared 
language for communication. This takes time to develop, on the basis of interaction, and 
represents a dedicated investment, so that relations have to last a sufficiently long time to 
make the investment worthwhile. 
 
Commitment and trust 
 
 We need to consider not incidental and unrelated transactions as in transaction cost 
economics, but transactions in the setting of an exchange relationship that develops in time 
(Granovetter 1985, Helper 1987, Ring and Van de Ven 1992, Sako 1992, Gulati 1995, 
Nooteboom 1996, de Jong 1999). Not the transaction –as in Williamson's theory– but the 
relationship needs to be the unit of analysis. One reason for this was argued in the previous 
section: the need to develop and recoup dedicated investments in the building, exchange, 
absorption and utilisation of complementary competence. 
 In addition to that, an important cause as well as a consequence of repeated 
interaction among firms is the emergence of commitment, as a basis for trust. Commitment is 
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an important safeguard for relational continuity. A committed partner does not immediately 
exit from the relationship in case of (unforeseen) problems, but engages in 'voice' (Hirschman 
1979, Helper 1987). Trust is a complex and slippery concept and cannot be fully discussed 
here (for a systematic discussion, see Nooteboom 2002). Trust and commitment can have 
both a calculative and an affective basis. Commitment may result from habitualisation (Gulati 
1995, Nooteboom et al. 1997, de Jong et al. 1997). Also, as a relationship develops, partners 
begin to know each other better, and can better assess the extent and limits of trustworthiness 
('knowledge based trust'). Convergence of cognitive frameworks may arise, which can lead to 
mutual identification ('identification based trust', cf. Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Partners 
understand and can identify with each other's goals, weaknesses and mistakes, and are able to 
engage in the give and take of voice. This does not entail that they always agree. There may 
be sharp disagreements, but those are combined with a willingness to express and discuss 
them more or less openly, while extending mutual benefit of the doubt. As a result, conflicts 
may deepen the relationship rather than breaking it. Mutual openness is essential to the 
building of trust (Zand 1972). An extensive communication system is necessary to facilitate 
the rich flow of information needed for the 'let's work things out' approach of the voice 
strategy. This information flow both requires and engenders a high degree of commitment to 
the relationship. In contrast, an exit-based strategy requires low commitment, so as to 
maintain the credibility of the threat to leave. 
 This does not entail that relations should last endlessly. Indeed, relations can become 
too durable, with too much mutual identification and trust, yielding rigidities and lack of the 
variety that is needed for learning. Relationships should last sufficiently long to recoup the 
investments necessary for high added value and learning by interaction, but not longer than 
that. What will emerge from this study is that while Japanese relations engendered high 
added value in durable collaboration, such collaboration can become too durable (Nooteboom 
1998).   
 
VARIABLES 
 
This paragraph defines eight firm- and relation-specific variables. In empirical research of 
inter-organisational relationships there is much variation in topics, aims, constructs, 
hypotheses, data collection and methods. Nevertheless, for most of the theoretical constructs 
incorporated in this study, similar or closely related constructs can be found in previous 
empirical studies. 
 
Supplier's dedicated investments 
 
 Supplier's dedicated investments are defined as investments in physical and/or human 
assets that are required to support the exchange in the focal relationship and are of less worth 
elsewhere (Williamson 1985). This core concept of transaction cost economics has been 
extensively employed in empirical research on transaction-cost explanations of vertical 
integration (e.g. Monteverde and Teece 1982, Walker and Weber 1984, Levy 1984, Anderson 
1985, Heide and John 1988, 1990, John and Weitz 1988, Anderson and Weitz 1989,) and 
relational governance (e.g. Dwyer et al. 1987, Heide and John 1992, Zaheer and 
Venkatraman 1995, Berger et al. 1995, Nooteboom et al. 1997, Noorderhaven et al.1998). 
With few exceptions, strong support is found for the expected effect of dedicated 
investments. They increase (perceived) risk of dependence (hold-up), and this tends to 
stimulate organisational integration. Heide and John (1990) find that dedicated investments 
also increase the extent of joint action. Further, they find that the supplier's investments in 
dedicated assets increase the expectations of relationship continuity. Buyer's dedicated 
investments are not included in the present analysis because they were absent or much less 
than suppliers' dedicated investments, and this is mostly the case in buyer-supplier relations. 
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Dependence 
 
 For both supplier and buyer, dependence is defined in terms of switching costs, i.e. as 
the loss due to a break of the relationship. Heide (1994) uses the replaceability of the firm's 
existing partner as a measure of the firm's dependence and shows that unilateral dependence 
undermines opportunities of flexibility, but that symmetric and high dependence promotes 
opportunities of flexibility. In a similar vein, Buchanan (1992) and Heide and John (1988) 
find that high mutual dependence enhances performance. Some studies on interorganisational 
exchange also incorporate the concepts of 'total interdependence' and 'interdependence 
asymmetry'. The former is the sum of both firms’ dependence, and the latter is the difference 
in dependence on the two sides of a dyad (Berger et al. 1995). Kumar et al. (1995) show that 
total interdependence in a channel relationship has a positive effect on commitment. Further, 
they find that greater interdependence asymmetry increases conflict and decreases 
commitment. Geyskens et al. (1996) show that greater total interdependence increases both 
'affective' and 'calculative' commitment. Berger et al. (1995) found similar effects on 
supplier's perceived dependence and supplier's net dependence (excess of own dependence 
over buyer's dependence). 
 
Value 
 
 From a competence perspective the value that partners offer each other, in terms of 
competence, is a crucial variable. Value is defined as the competencies (including skills, 
knowledge and experience) partners offer each other. Transaction cost economics has a rather 
limited perspective on the value of the partner because it mainly emphasises the cost 
economising relevance of interorganisational exchange. Beside productive efficiency, value 
includes many more dimensions such as developmental capacity, value as a source of 
learning (innovative capabilities), international presence, and continuity. 
 
Commitment 
 
 Customer's commitment is defined as the customer's efforts to maintain and continue 
the relationship (cf. Helper 1987). Most empirical studies find strong support for the 
expected positive effect of trust on 'continuance' commitment (e.g. Anderson and Weitz 1989, 
Achrol 1991, Moorman et al. 1992, Morgan and Hunt 1994). Geyskens et al. (1996) find that 
commitment is greater when total interdependence is higher and that when asymmetry 
increases, commitment decreases for the less dependent party and increases for the more 
dependent party. Berger et al. (1995) find that trust in buyer's 'goodwill' has a negative effect 
on the dependence perceived by the supplier. Nooteboom et al. (1997) found confirmation of 
the expectation that trust has a negative effect on the perceived probability of relational loss. 
 
Future perspectives 
 
 Expectations of the future, or the 'shadow of the future', have an important impact 
(Macneil 1974, Heide and Miner 1992, Nooteboom 1996). In terms of the distinction made 
by Nooteboom et al. (1997) between effects on the size and on the probability of relational 
loss, expectations or 'future perspectives' have an effect on both. The supplier's future 
perspectives is defined as the supplier's expected continuation of the relationship with the 
dedicated customer of the focal dyad at a given point in time (cf. Parkhe 1993). Heide and 
Miner (1992) find support for the hypothesis that anticipated open-ended future interaction, 
which they define as 'extendedness', increases the chance of a pattern of co-operative 
behavior. Parkhe (1993) also showed that co-operative performance is promoted the longer 
the 'shadow of the future'. Anderson and Weitz (1989) also found that expectations of open-
ended interaction between buyers and suppliers have a positive influence on the supplier's 
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investments in dedicated assets. This is consistent with the theory and experiments on 
repeated games (Axelrod 1984, Heide and John 1990), which show that an expectation of 
relational continuity increases collaboration. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
 Uncertainty is an important variable in TCE and refers to the difficulty in predicting 
actions of partners or outside contingencies. Consistent with Williamson (1985) several 
studies have shown that uncertainty demands greater vertical integration in order to gain the 
opportunity to monitor and direct behavior (Anderson 1985, Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). 
Other studies, however, show conflicting evidence of the effects of uncertainty (Balakrishnan 
and Weber 1984, Anderson 1994). Nooteboom (1999) claims that greater uncertainty causes 
firms to engage more in outside relations, not less. We employ a variable 'supplier's 
uncertainty avoidance', which refers to the supplier's inclination or desire to avoid risks. One 
way to avoid risks is to avoid switching costs, by holding back on dedicated investments.  
 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
This section develops our model, with causal relations between the variables identified in the 
previous paragraph. While previous studies tended to explain single variables, such as 
dependence, perceived relational risk, form of governance (integration, contracting), we take 
into account the fact that variables interact in more complex ways. Variables are explained by 
others but also constitute explanatory variables for them, in chains of causation that can be 
circular. One particularly important causal loop is the following. Dedicated investments yield 
dependence and hence relational risk, but they may also increase the unique value one offers 
to the partner, which increases his dependence and his commitment, and thereby reduces 
relational risk. It is important to test if this causal loop indeed occurs. If it does, it may 
indicate that there can be governance by mutual dependence on the basis of dedicated 
investments, without the need for detailed contracting. This is particularly important when 
contracts are costly and cumbersome, and may block the innovation and learning which is the 
purpose of the relationship. Clusters of hypotheses will be presented under four headings that 
represent what we propose as the main features of supply relationships: dedicated 
investments, value of the partner, commitment and uncertainty. 
 
Dedicated investments 
 
 The hypotheses concerning the determinants and consequences of dedicated 
investments are as follows: 
 
H1A  supplier’s dedicated investment has a positive effect on the supplier's dependence. 
H1B supplier's future perspectives has a positive effect on the supplier's dedicated 
investments. 
H1C customer's value to the supplier has a positive effect on supplier's dedicated 
investments. 
 
 According to transaction cost economics, hold-up risk derives from dependence as 
the result of switching costs, which arise from dedicated investments. This yields hypothesis 
1A. 
 One safeguard against relational risk suggested by transaction cost economics is 
vertical integration. In the present study vertical integration does not arise because we study 
relationships between two autonomous entities. Other safeguards are contracts, shared 
ownership of dedicated assets, and the use of hostages. Contracts are indeed used. There will 
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seldom be no contract at all. However, contracts may have several parts and may serve a 
variety of purposes (Klein Woolthuis 1999). One purpose is technical, to serve as a mere 
record, to support memory, like minutes of a meeting. This type of content can be quite 
extensive if the interface between partners is technically complex. Another purpose of a 
contract may be symbolic, as the seal of a psychological rather than a legal contract, or as a 
ritual of agreement. This type of contract tends to be very limited in content. Finally, a 
contract may indeed have the purpose intended by transaction cost economics, to safeguard 
against possible opportunism. To find out what the role of a contract is, one cannot simply 
record whether a contract is in place (there will always be a contract in some form). Nor is it 
sufficient to measure the size of the contract, since extensive contracts may have the purpose 
not of safeguarding against opportunism but of a record for technical co-ordination. In fact, 
contracts often lack the detailed contractual safeguards that transaction cost economics 
suggests. Such safeguards are inevitably incomplete; the more so to the extent that there is 
uncertainty and the purpose of the relationship is innovation. They can be very costly to 
monitor and to re-specify when circumstances change, and may be a source for mutual 
distrust when applied strictly. However, the principle of safeguarding remains important. It 
can be achieved by other means than contracts. For lack of a relevant measure of contracts we 
do not include a hypothesis stating that dedicated investments lead to contracts for 
safeguarding. In view of the limited viability of contracts as safeguards this may not 
constitute a problem. Macauley (1963) already indicated the limited significance of contracts 
in collaborative relations. 
 We propose several determinants of dedicated investments. Firstly, there must be 
future perspectives, i.e. the perspective of future exchange is needed to ensure that dedicated 
assets will be recouped. This yields hypothesis 1B. A second determinant comes from the 
competence perspective, where value of the partner is the core concept. The customer's value 
to the supplier can be defined as all skills, competencies, and capabilities the customer can 
offer the supplier. The more important the customer is to the supplier, the more incentives the 
supplier will have to invest in the relationship to make sure that the relationship continues 
and it maintains access to the customer's resources. This yields hypothesis 1C. 
 
Value of the supplier 
  
 The hypotheses concerning supplier's value to the customer are as follows: 
 
H2A  Supplier’s dedicated investment has a positive effect on the supplier's value to the 
customer. 
H2B Supplier's value to the customer has a positive effect on customer's dependence. 
 
 Transaction cost economics is certainly correct to argue that dedicated investments 
may create risks of dependence. However, dedicated investments also create value and this 
may create countervailing dependence. When the supplier makes dedicated investments, he 
will be better able to perform tasks that are geared to the specific needs of the buyer, and 
therefore the supplier's value to the customer will increase. This yields Hypothesis 2A. 
Examples of the two-sided effect of dedicated investments, on supplier dependence and his 
value to the customer, are Toyota's customer supplier just-in-time systems (Dyer and Ouchi 
1993). Customised investments are necessary to realise organisational input (division of 
labor, cycle times, and staff training), information systems, plants and other flexible 
manufacturing systems often not readily applicable to other partners. The customised 
investments, however, also create value because they reduce complexity and costs by 
eliminating inventories and work in progress, which ensures that there are no unnecessary 
buffer stocks, distribution facilities or quality inspections. 
 Value created by the supplier for the customer increases the latter's dependence. This 
yields hypothesis 2B. 
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Buyer commitment 
 
 The antecedent and two consequences of customer's commitment are as follows: 
 
H3A Customer's dependence will have a positive effect on customer's commitment. 
H3B Customer's commitment will have a positive effect on customer's value to the 
supplier. 
H3C Customer's commitment will have a positive effect on supplier's future perspectives. 
 
 Thus far we considered risks, safeguards, and the development of competencies. 
Next, we turn to customer's commitment, i.e. the customer's motivation for continuation of a 
long-term supply relationship. Calculative commitment (cf. Geyskens et al. 1996) refers to 
the customer's need to maintain the relationship given the anticipated switching costs 
associated with leaving. It is the result of the calculation of costs and benefits, including an 
assessment of the investments made in the relationship and the ability to replace or make up 
for the foregone investments should the relationship be terminated. Hence, the greater the 
customer's dependence, the greater the customer's commitment. This is hypothesis 3A. 
 As explained by Helper in her exit-voice approach, customer's commitment refers to 
all the customer's efforts to work out problems with the supplier rather than ending the 
relationship. Therefore, customer's commitment will contribute to the customer's value to the 
supplier. For example, a new supplier may present himself, offering a similar product of 
equal quality but at a lower price than the customer's current supplier. As a response, a 
committed customer will offer his current supplier assistance –for example, via specialised 
technical support teams– to help the current supplier to lower his price and to match his 
competitor's production performance. This yields hypothesis 3B. 
 Finally, we expect the customer's commitment to be related to the supplier's future 
expectations of the relationship. Customer's commitment is an indicator for the supplier that 
the customer will not end the relationship in the short run. Therefore, customer's commitment 
will increase the supplier's future perspectives. This yields hypothesis 3C. 
 
Uncertainty avoidance 
 
 The hypothesis concerning uncertainty avoidance are as follows: 
 
H4A Customer's commitment will have a negative effect on supplier's uncertainty 
avoidance. 
H4B Supplier's uncertainty avoidance will have a negative effect on supplier's dedicated 
investments. 
H4C Supplier's dependence has a positive effect on supplier's uncertainty avoidance. 
 
 Customer's commitment indicates that the customer will not engage in opportunistic 
behavior as soon as the opportunity and an incentive for it arise. In other words, he will 
engage more in voice than in exit. This increases the willingness of the supplier to accept 
dependence. This yields hypothesis H4A.  
 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance refers to the supplier's inclination or desire to avoid 
risks, in particular hold-up risk. This risk is determined by the degree to which one is 
dependent, as a result of dedicated investments. Hence, one way of reducing the risk of hold-
up is to reduce dedicated investments and thus reduce dependence. This yields hypothesis 
4B: uncertainty avoidance has a negative effect on dedicated investments. 
 Suppliers dependence increases his perceived relational risk, and hence uncertainty 
avoidance. This is hypothesis 4C. 
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The causality of supply relationships 
 
 The eleven hypotheses are summarised in Table 1. Together, they yield our 
theoretical model. This model is presented in Figure 1. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
 
Data 
 
 We employ data on supply relationships that were collected via surveys in the 
automobile industries of the United States, Japan and Europe. The surveys were part of and 
financed by the International Motor Vehicle Program of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (Cambridge, the United States), and were executed by Susan Helper and Mari 
Sako. The surveys were mailed to the first-tier suppliers of automobile producers. 
Respondents were asked to answer the survey questions for their most important customer 
regarding one product that was typical of their company's output and with which they were 
familiar. The response rates specified below were after accounting for those firms which 
were unreachable (mail sent to them was returned undelivered), and those which were not 
eligible to participate in the survey (they were not first-tier suppliers, or they specialised in 
supplying for heavy trucks and buses). 
 In spring 1993, the US survey was mailed to every automotive supplier and 
automaker division mentioned in the Elm guide to Automotive Sourcing. This guide lists the 
major first-tier suppliers –both domestic and foreign owned– to manufacturers of cars and 
light trucks in the United States and Canada. The target respondents were the divisional 
directors of marketing at independent firms and the divisional business managers or directors 
of strategic planning at car manufacturer components divisions. Since they commonly take a 
lead in interfacing with customers, they were deemed the most knowledgeable informants 
about customers' procurement practices. The US respondents had a wealth of experience, and 
were thus the single individuals able to answer all of the questions for the customer/product 
pair they chose. US respondents averaged more than 18 years in the automobile industry and 
more than 11 years in their companies. The response rate of the US survey was 55 per cent. 
The US survey provides detailed information about 665 supply relationships. 
 In Japan the survey (in Japanese) was sent out in July 1993 to all members of the 
Japan Auto Parts Industries Association (JAPIA), to all automotive suppliers named in Nihon 
no Jidosha Buhin Kogyo 1992/1993 (Japanese Automotive Parts Industry, published by Auto 
Trade Journal Co. Inc. and JAPIA, Tokyo, 1992), and to the component divisions of vehicle 
manufacturers. The latter publication lists all first-tier suppliers (both domestic and foreign-
owned) to the eleven manufacturers of cars and trucks in Japan. In order to maintain 
consistency with the US sample, the respondents were asked not to respond with respect to 
heavy trucks and buses. The target respondent in Japan was the director of sales and 
marketing at independent firms. For member companies of JAPIA, the survey was sent to the 
main contacts named by JAPIA, many of whom were either chief executives or marketing 
directors. JAMA (the Japan Auto Manufacturers Association) took responsibility to identify 
the respondents for the vehicle manufacturer components divisions. The Japanese 
respondents were generally well experienced: they had worked for 22 years on average at 
their company. The response rate was 30 percent, with 45 percent among JAPIA members. 
The Japanese survey provides detailed information about 472 supply relationships. 
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 In the spring of 1994, the European survey was sent out to about 1,600 major 
automotive suppliers in Western Europe. This sample was compiled from several sources, 
including trade associations and the major vehicle manufacturers in Europe. The target 
respondent was the director of sales and marketing at each firm. Here also, respondents were 
asked not to respond with respect to heavy trucks and buses. The respondents had a wealth of 
experience: European respondents averaged 16 years in the automobile industry and 8 years 
with their companies. The response rate was 16 percent: 25 percent among suppliers from the 
United Kingdom, 24 percent from Germany, 9 percent from France, and 10 percent from 
Italy. The European survey provides detailed information about 268 supply relationships. 
 The data employed in this study have three main advantages. First, they provide very 
detailed information about the relationship between a supplier and a customer, which enable 
us to construct the many variables that we are interested in. Second, many items required the 
respondent to score on a Likert or a semantic differential type scale; i.e. many items refer to 
the perceptions of respondents. Measuring perceptions is increasingly acknowledged as being 
important because it is often perceptions rather than objective criteria that drive a firm's 
decision-making process. Third, the data allowed us to compare the three regions of the US, 
Japan and Europe. Fourth, the data concerned the automobile industry, which in all the three 
regions considered is one of the main industries in terms of its contribution to gross domestic 
product and employment. The automobile is a complex product to which supply relationships 
are tremendously important. An average car consists of about 15,000 components, all of 
which have to be produced, delivered and assembled in order to produce a well-functioning 
vehicle. As a result, supply does not concern mere commodities, and collaboration on the 
basis of dedicated investments is highly relevant.   
 
Selection and response 
 
 Supply relationships have at least three phases: they start, they develop, and they end. 
Given that this paper focuses on the in-between part of ongoing interorganisational exchange, 
we decided to delete those respondents that answered the survey with respect to young, initial 
relationships. The survey incorporated a question that asked the respondent to indicate 
approximately how long (in years) they sold products in the particular product line to the 
specific customer. We used this information to remove all respondents having a past duration 
of the relationship of three years or less. The selection procedure results in three databases 
that provide us with detailed information on 553, 450 and 226 supply relationships in the 
United States, Japan and Europe respectively. 
 The European response rate may seem low. A low response rate is particularly 
worrisome when one intends to analyse levels of variables. The main aim of  this study, 
however, is to identify causal relationships between variables, and here the issue is more 
indirect: is there any reason why there should be a response bias in causal relations? With 
respect to both the United States and Japan, non-response bias is assessed in several ways. 
First, the characteristics of those who returned the survey were compared to those of the 
entire population. On the characteristics of size and location no significant differences are 
found. Second, the survey respondents are divided into two groups based on response data. 
The hypothesis is that those who responded only after the second follow-up mailing might 
have more in common with those who did not respond at all than those who responded early. 
This test shows no significant differences for early and late respondents on any of the 
measures reported in appendix A. The statistical significance in both cases is judged using a 
one per cent cut-off point. With respect to Europe, a non-response analysis is not available 
and hence, a non-response bias may exist. 
 
Method 
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 This study follows the two-step approach of LISREL, separating the measurement 
models from the structural model (Hair et al. 1995, Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993a, 1993b). 
Multi -item measures based on construct definitions were developed for the six latent 
constructs: supplier’s dependence, customer's dependence, supplier's value, customer's value, 
customer's commitment, and supplier's uncertainty avoidance. As usual, observed indicators 
that constitute the items of the survey measure these latent constructs. The other two 
constructs, supplier's dedicated investments and supplier's future perspectives, are measured 
by one item. Appendix A provides an overview of the eight constructs and the corresponding 
items of the survey. In the choice of items, much use has been made of previous empirical 
studies.  
 For the factor-analytic measurement of the latent constructs we used LISREL's 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedure, based on a polychoric correlation matrix of 
items per construct. The acceptance level for factor-loadings was the usual .30 and estimated 
t-values should be larger than 2. Scale items for a specific construct were added to obtain 
composite measures for the six latent constructs. 
 For the structural model we again used LISREL's ML estimation procedure –based 
on the correlation matrix of the eight constructs– to obtain the standardised estimates of the 
parameter coefficients and the t-values. This information is used to test the hypotheses. A 
hypothesis is considered to be confirmed if the estimated path-coefficient is significant and 
has the hypothesised sign. A t-value larger than 1.28 corresponds to p<.10 (weakly 
significant); a t-value larger than 1.65 corresponds to p<.05 (moderately significant) and a t-
value larger than 2.33 to p<.01 (strongly significant). Also, we used LISREL to calculate 
three of the most common indicators for the evaluation of the global model-fit (Boomsma 
1996, Browne and Cudeck 1992, Jaros et al. 1993). These global model-fit indicators are the 
goodness-of-fit (GFI) index, the adjusted goodness-of-fit (AGFI) index, and the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA). For the GFI and AGFI, a value greater than .90 is 
considered an indication of good fit. For the RMSEA, a value smaller than .08 is considered 
an indication of good fit. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Measurement of variables 
 
 Table 2 gives the end results of the measurement of constructs for all three regions: 
US, Japan and Europe. 
 
------------------------ 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------ 
 
 Table 2 shows that for all three regions all items for the constructs supplier's 
dependence, customer's dependence, customer's value, customer's commitment, and supplier's 
uncertainty avoidance pass the various criteria: factor-loadings exceed .30 and are significant. 
A special case is the latent construct 'supplier's value'. Eight items were selected which were 
expected to measure this construct. The analysis resulted in three factors which have a clear 
interpretation: the supplier's value in terms of his skills (factor 1), innovative capabilities 
(factor 2), and technical competencies (factor 3). It is striking that this outcome applies to all 
three regions. This empirically confirms the importance of different dimensions of value in 
terms of competencies. 
 Given the satisfactory results we added the scale items for a specific construct to 
obtain composite measures for the six latent constructs. For one construct we made an 
adjustment. The construct 'supplier's uncertainty avoidance' is measured by the additive scale 
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of SUA1 and SUA2 divided by 'supplier's dedicated investments'. The two items that measure 
uncertainty avoidance incorporate the notion of dedicated investments. As a result, high 
scores on these items may be the result of either high levels of uncertainty avoidance –as 
intended– or high levels of dedicated investments. The additive scale is divided by 'dedicated 
investments' to correct for the latter. The other two constructs are measured by a single item, 
i.e. 'supplier's dedicated investments' by the amount of dedicated investments in the 1988-
1992 period expressed in local currency (logarithm scale), and 'supplier's future perspectives' 
by the expected continuation of supply to the customer, expressed in number of years. Table 
3 gives the averages for the eight constructs in the three regions. For all three regions, the 
summary statistics and the correlation matrices for the eight constructs are presented in 
Appendix B. 
 
------------------------ 
Table 3 about here 
------------------------ 
 
 The literature has suggested systemic differences between the three regions, due to 
different approaches to buyer-supplier relationships, based on deep cultural and institutional 
differences. From that perspective, it is striking that in Table 3 most averages of the 
constructs for the three regions are quite close, and the differences that do arise run counter 
to expectations. For example, both supplier and customer dependence, as well as customer's 
commitment had similar values in the three regions. This belies the idea that in contrast with 
Japan Western companies avoid dependence and commitment, in supposedly ad hoc, arms-
length transactions. Concerning the observed differences, it is striking that in Japan the 
average level of dedicated investments is much lower than in the US and EU (less than a 
third). One would have expected the opposite, from the perspective of durable 'Japanese' 
buyer-supplier relations in vertically connected 'keiretsu'. The difference is somewhat 
misleading because Japanese investments are measured in Yen (5.92, logarithm), US 
investments in dollars (14.10, logarithm) and European investments in a collection of 
currencies (16.48, logarithm). However, even when we converted these figures into a 
common currency –by means of an exchange rate– the same result appears: on average 
Japanese dedicated investments are still much lower than in the US and Europe. Customer's 
commitment in Japan is hardly higher than in the US, and lower than in the EU, which raises 
questions concerning the supposedly more 'loyal' relations in Japan. Furthermore, again in 
contrast with the received view, supplier's uncertainty avoidance in the supposedly more 
'loyal' Japan is not lower than in the US and EU, but twice as high. Supplier's value is highest 
in the US. The fact that in Japan supplier's future perspectives is clearly highest, followed by 
the EU, conforms better with the received view. On average, in Japan suppliers in our sample 
expect the relationship to continue for about 25 years, in the US 8 years, and in Europe a 
little over 17 years.  
 For supplier's uncertainty avoidance the apparent difference is due to the fact that we 
adjusted the scale by dividing it by dedicated investments (which are relatively low in Japan, 
as noticed above). Without correction for dedicated investments uncertainty avoidance has 
approximately the same levels in the three regions (6.33 for US, 6.05 for Japan and 6.06 for 
Europe). 
 We conclude that while perhaps in the past there might have been great differences in 
buyer-supplier relations, there has been a certain amount of convergence. Also in the West, 
buyer-supplier relations are now characterised, at least in the auto industry, by significant 
levels of dedicated investments, mutual dependence, and buyer's commitment. Apparently, 
the West has learned from Japan concerning the benefits of a certain durability and mutual 
dependence in relations. Having said that, we do see some differences, and to investigate 
them further we proceed to the analysis of causal relations between the variables.  
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The causal model 
 
 We now turn to the testing of the hypotheses. The estimates of the causal model are 
reported in Figures 2, 3 and 4 for the US, Japan and the EU. The results for the three regions 
are brought together in table 4. In all three regions, the values of GFI and AGFI exceed the 
minimum of .90 and the values of RMSEA are less than the maximum .08. We conclude that 
the model fit is good. 
 
------------------------------- 
Figures 2, 3, 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
------------------------- 
 
 In all regions there is strong support for Hypothesis 4B that uncertainty avoidance 
has a negative effect on dedicated investments. One way of reducing the risk of hold-up is to 
reduce dedicated investments and thus reduce dependence. This, of course, is not a new 
insight, and just confirms part of transaction cost theory thinking. 
 A newer result is that in all three regions supplier's dedicated investments indeed 
have the double effect of increasing supplier's dependence (H1A) but also supplier's value to 
the customer (H2A), and in all three regions these effects are strongly significant. This 
confirms our ideas about the double function of dedicated investments: they create risks 
because they increase the supplier's switching costs, but they also create value, which create 
mutual dependence, which mitigates risks. Nooteboom et al. (1997) tested the effects of 
dedicated investments and value on perceived relational risk. Relational risk was assessed in 
two dimensions: the probability that something will go wrong and the size of the loss 
incurred when it does. They found that the buyer's value to the supplier has the expected 
positive effect on the size of potential loss to the supplier, but their study did not confirm the 
expectation that the suppliers value to the buyer has a negative effect on the supplier's 
perceived probability of relational loss. They explained this anomaly by blaming reality 
rather than the hypothesis. They argued that suppliers were not sophisticated enough in their 
thinking: they do not but should take into account the effect of their value on the probability 
of opportunistic action by the buyer. One aim of the present study was to see whether 
supplier value here has the expected negative effect on perceived relational risk. The 
empirical results suggest that it does, in a roundabout way. Supplier’s value has a positive 
effect on customer’s dependence, which has a positive effect on customer’s commitment, 
which has a negative effect on the supplier’s perceived need to avoid relational risk 
(‘uncertainty avoidance’). 
 There is strong support in all three regions for the hypothesis (H2B) that the value of 
the supplier increases the dependence of the buyer. In all three regions there is also strong 
support for two of the hypotheses concerning the role of commitment (H3A, H3B and H3C): 
customer's dependence increases commitment, and this contributes to customer's value and 
supplier's future perspectives. However, concerning the hypothesised negative effect of 
customer commitment on uncertainty avoidance (H4A) the evidence is mixed. It is weakly 
confirmed in the US (p < .10), strongly confirmed in the EU (p < 0.1), but it is not confirmed 
in Japan. Apparently, the logic of using dedicated investments to make the customer 
dependent and thereby reduce relational risk does not operate in Japan. 
 Other differences between the regions arise in the determinants of dedicated 
investments. As noted before, in all regions there is strong support for the negative effect of 
uncertainty avoidance on dedicated investment (H4B). However, the regions deviate 
concerning the hypothesised positive effects on dedicated investments of customer value 
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(H1C) and future perspectives (H1B). These are both confirmed only in the US, the first 
strongly (H1C: p<.01), and the second weakly (H1B: p<.10). The latter low level of 
significance may be due to the fact that the variable 'supplier's future perspectives' is one of 
the two variables without a (multivariate) normal distribution. In Japan the influence of 
future perspectives is strongly confirmed, but there is no significant effect of customer's 
value. This indicates that in the US dedicated investments are strongly oriented towards 
valuable partners, while in Japan they are more oriented towards continuity of the relation. In 
the EU there is no significant effect of either variable. In Europe, neither customer value nor 
future perspectives seem to be an argument for dedicated investment. We checked whether 
this lack of effect might be explained by lack of variation of the two variables. We found that 
the coefficient of variation of customer's value was low in Japan (0.18) relative to the US 
(0.29) and EU (0.25). This may explain the lack of effect in Japan but not the lack of effect in 
the EU. The coefficient of variation for future perspectives was not less in the EU (1.69), but 
on the contrary higher, than in the US (0.73) and Japan (1.15).    
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Results 
 
 This study offers a comparative analysis of the variables and the causality between 
hem that drive supply relationships in the US, Japan, and Europe. It is based on a 
combination of elements from different theoretical perspectives: the competence perspective, 
supplemented with a theoretical perspective of knowledge and learning, insights in issues of 
governance from transaction cost economics, and a perspective of social exchange 
concerning commitment in relations. From theory we specified constructs to be measured 
from indicators that were largely derived from earlier empirical research. Comparing the 
measurements of those constructs between the three regions, we found considerable 
convergence, which contradicts earlier stories about fundamental, culture-bound systemic 
differences. The few differences we do find also contradict those stories. 
 Concerning the causal model, the main conclusion is that most hypotheses are 
confirmed in the United States, Japan and Europe and that the theoretical model fits the three 
datasets well. In other words, we find that that the causal structures of supply relationships in 
the Triad regions are more or less the same. There appears to be considerable convergence 
towards a common system. In the West, the car industry has learned from the collaborative 
buyer-supplier relations in Japan. 
 However, we do find some differences, and those may be significant. They can be 
summed up as follows. In Japan the level of dedicated investments is lower than in the West 
(see Table 3), and they are more based on future expectations, i.e. expected continuity of 
buyer-supplier relations, than on value of the customer. Customer’s commitment as a result 
of dependence resulting from dedicated investments is not seen as reducing relational risk. In 
the US dedicated investments are more oriented towards valuable partners. Future 
perspectives is the smallest among the three regions, but it does have a weakly significant 
effect on dedicated investments. In Europe future perspectives takes an intermediate value. 
Neither customer value nor future perspectives have a significant effect on dedicated 
investments. 
 The US case conforms most to expectations, confirming all hypotheses. The evidence 
clearly indicates that in the US customer-supplier relations have turned around from short-
term, arms-length relations, with an emphasis on price, to more durable, co-operative 
relations focused on joint production of added value on the basis of complementary 
competencies. However, there still appears to be a difference in the duration of such co-
operative relations, and in the scope for suppliers to choose from a variety of potential 
customers. This offers advantages. Relations need to be long enough to recoup dedicated 
investments and to build up co-operation, on the basis of mutual understanding, trust and 
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joint development. But relations may also be too long; causing undue rigidity and lack of the 
variety of relations that is needed for innovation (cf. Nooteboom 1998). Given that in Japan 
suppliers are more locked into separate vertical industrial structures (keiretsu), with limited 
choice of partners across the boundaries of a keiretsu, the consequence would be as follows. 
The expected effect of customer value on dedicated investments follows from the opportunity 
for the best suppliers to choose the most attractive customers, and engage in more dedicated 
investments for them, leaving the less attractive customers to the less attractive suppliers. 
Those have less incentive to tie themselves down with dedicated investments, and prefer to 
maintain an opportunity to switch to a more attractive customer later. In the Japanese system, 
with a narrower scope of choice, limited by the boundaries of keiretsu, we would expect the 
effect of customer value to be less. Due to the lock-in effect of keiretsu there is less incentive 
for suppliers to compete for the most attractive customers by engaging in more dedicated 
investments. As a result, the average level of dedicated investments is lower. With a limited 
choice of customers, suppliers can only be enticed to engage more in dedicated investments 
by offering better conditions in terms of a durable relation, guaranteed by high commitment. 
This explanation is confirmed by the fact that in Japan the coefficient of variation of 
customer value (0.18) is less than in the US (0.29). Thus dedicated investments depend only 
on the expected duration of the relation, i.e. future perspectives, fed by customer 
commitment. In Japan, dedicated investments are not used to reduce relational risk but rather 
to confirm long term commitments inside keiretsu. 
 Of course what we offer here is only a hypothesis, inferred from the outcomes of the 
study, and would need independent testing. This is of some importance. If the benefits of 
durable relations can be obtained without making the relations longer and more rigid than 
necessary, and maintaining more variety of relations, this may be better from the perspective 
of innovation. In other words: in the US a 'third way' (Nooteboom 1998) may have been 
found which combines the advantages of sufficiently durable relations with the advantages of 
a more open system with greater variety. This would combine advantages of higher quality 
with higher dynamic, innovative efficiency. This is reflected in both lower levels of expected 
duration of relations and the weaker effect of that expectation on the level of dedicated 
investments. If our interpretation is correct, the Japanese may now learn from the Americans. 
This would entail that they break down the keiretsu system to allow for more variety and 
lesser durability of vertical relations. 
 We find the results for Europe more difficult to interpret. As in the US, customer 
commitment, created by supplier value, as a result of dedicated investments, is seen to reduce 
relational risk, which can neutralise the fact that dedicated investments also increase 
dependence. However, in contrast with the US, customer value does not have an effect on 
dedicated investments. In contrast with Japan, future perspectives does not have an effect 
either. In Europe the durability of relations takes an intermediate position between the US 
and Japan. 
  
Research design 
 
 The method used in this study offered two advantages. This first is that in the 
comparative study we were able to investigate differences between the US, Japan and 
Europe. The second is that by using the LISREL method we were able to test multiple and 
circular causal patterns. One such pattern is that dedicated investments not only increase 
dependence, and hence relational risk, but also increases customer dependence and 
commitment, which reduces relational risk. This causal cycle confirms the idea that risks of 
dependence due to dedicated investments can be governed by mutual dependence.    
 A clear disadvantage of our study is that it is cross-sectional. It would be better to 
test the causal effects in a longitudinal study in which the sequencing of effects is studied 
explicitly and implications are tested for the development and the management of 
relationships in time. However, it is difficult to envisage a repetition of the collection of the 
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large volumes of survey data needed for a LISREL analysis, in all three regions, for a 
sequence of points in time. Furthermore, for some variables one would need a larger 
frequency of observation than for others. Nevertheless, the results of this study should be 
tested in longitudinal research, in a design for data that would be feasible to collect. 
 A second limitation is that the data were gathered from only one side of the interfirm 
dyad. This precluded any analysis of how the supplier's and the customer's perceptions differ 
about the working of the supply relationship. 
 A third limitation of course is that the study applies only to the car industry, and the 
results cannot be generalised to other industries without further tests. In particular, when we 
conclude that the US have learned from Japanese buyer-supplier relationships, and may 
subsequently have improved on them, the question remains whether that is also the case in 
other industries.  
 17
 
REFERENCES 
 
Achrol, R. (1991), "Evolution of the Market Organization: New Forms for Turbulent 
Environments," Journal of Marketing, 55, 77-93. 
Anderson, E. (1985), "The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee: A Transaction Cost 
Analysis," Journal of Marketing, 47, 55-67. 
Anderson, E. and Weitz, B. (1989), "Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial 
Channel Dyads," Marketing Science, 8, 310-323. 
Anderson, E. (1994), "Transaction Cost Analysis and Marketing," paper presented at the 
conference 'Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond', Rotterdam: Erasmus 
University. 
Axelrod, R. (1984), The evolution of Co-operation, New York: Basic Books. 
Baumgarten, H. and Homburg, C. (1996), "Applications of Structural Equation Modeling in 
Marketing and Consumer Research: A Review," International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 13, 139-161. 
Berger, H., Noorderhaven, N.G., and Nooteboom, B. (1995), Determinants of Supplier 
Dependence: An Empirical Study, pp. 195-212 in J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis, and 
S.E. Sjöstrand (Eds.), "On Economic Institutions. Theory and Applications," 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Boomsma, A. (1996), "The Adequateness of Covariance Structural Models: An Overview of 
Measures and Indices," Kwantitatieve Methoden, 52, 7-52. 
Browne, M.W., and Cudeck, R. (1992), "Alternative Ways of Assessing Model Fit," 
Sociological Methods and Research, 21, 230-258. 
Buchanan, L. (1992), "Vertical Trade Relationships: The Role of Dependence and Symmetry 
in Attaining Organizational Goals," Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 65-75. 
Choo, C. W. (1998), The knowing organization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coase, R. (1937), "The Nature of the Firm," Economica N.S., 4, 386-405. 
Cohen, M.D. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990), "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on 
Learning and Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly, 35, 128-52. 
Cusumano, M.A. (1985), The Japanese Automobile Industry, Council on East Asian Studies, 
Cambridge M.A.: Harvard University Press. 
Cusumano, M.A., and Takeishi, A. (1991), "Supplier Relations and Management: A Survey 
of Japanese, Japanese-Transplant and US Autoplants," Strategic Management 
Journal, 12, 563-588. 
Dore, R. (1987), Taking Japan Seriously, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Dwyer, F.R., Schurr, P.H., and Oh, S. (1987), "Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships," 
Journal of Marketing, 51, 11-27. 
Dyer, J.H., and Ouchi, W.G. (1993), "Japanese-Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a 
Competitive Edge," Sloan Management Review, 51-63. 
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.E.M., Scheer, L.K., and Kumar, N. (1996), "The Effects of Trust 
and Interdependence on Relationship Commitment: A Trans-Atlantic Study," 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 13, 303-317. 
Granovetter, M. (1985), "Economic Action and Social Structure: A Theory of 
Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91, 481-510. 
Gulati, R. (1995), "Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for 
Contractual Choice in Alliances," Academy of Management Journal, 38, 85-112. 
Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L., and Black, W.C. (1995), Multivariate Data 
Analysis 4th Edition, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Heide, J.B. (1994), "Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels," Journal of 
Marketing, 58, 71-85. 
 18
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1988), "The Role of Dependence-Balancing in Safeguarding 
Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional Channels," Journal of Marketing, 52, 
20-35. 
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1990), "Alliances in Industrial Purchasing: The Determinants of 
Joint Action in Buyer-Supplier Relationships," Journal of Marketing Research, 27, 
24-36. 
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1992), "Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships?," Journal of 
Marketing, 56, 32-44. 
Heide, J.B. and Miner, A.S. (1992), "The Shadow of the Future: Effects of Anticipated 
Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Co-operation," Academy of 
Management Journal, 35, 265-291. 
Helper, S. (1987), "Supplier Relationships and Innovation: Theory and Application to the 
U.S. Auto Industry," Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University. 
Helper, S. (1994), "Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back in the Automotive Supplier 
Relations," Technovation, 14, 663-640. 
Hirschman, A. (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hofstede, G. (1980), Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related 
Values, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Jaros, S.J., Jermier, J.M., Koehler, J.W., and Sincich, T. (1993), "Effects of Continuance, 
Affective, and Moral Commitment on the Withdrawal Process: an Evaluation of 
Eight Structural Equation Models," Academy of Management Journal, 36, 951-995. 
John, G. and Weitz, B. (1988), "Forward Integration into Distribution: An Empirical Test of 
Transaction Cost Analysis," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 4, 337-
355. 
de Jong, G. (1999), "Causal Loops in Long-Term Supply Relationships. Theory and Evidence 
from the United States, Japan, and Europe," Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Groningen. 
de Jong, G. and Nooteboom, B. (2000), The Causal Structure of Long-Term Supply 
Relationships. An Empirical Test of a Generalized Transaction Cost Theory. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
de Jong, G., Nooteboom, B., and Vossen, R.W. (1997), The Effects of Firm- and Relation-
Specific Characteristics on Quality of Supplier Relationships, pp. 61-84 in P.B. 
Boorsma, K. Aarts, and A.E. Steenge (Eds.), "Public Priority Setting: Rules and 
Costs," Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Jöreskog, K. and Sörbom, D. (1993a), LISREL 8: Structural Equation Modeling with the 
SIMPLIS Command Language, Chicago: Scientific Software International. 
Jöreskog, K. and Sörbom, D. (1993b), PRELIS 2: User's Reference Guide, Chicago: 
Scientific Software International. 
Joskow, P.L. (1987), "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical 
Evidence from Coal Markets," The American Economic Review, 77, 168-185. 
Kamath, R.R., and Liker, J.K. (1994), "A Second Look at Japanese Product Development," 
Harvard Businesss Review, 154-170. 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L.K., and Steenkamp, J.E.M. (1995), "The Effects of Perceived 
Interdependence on Dealer Attitudes," Journal of Marketing Research, 32, 348-356. 
Kumar, N., Scheer, L.K., and Steenkamp, J.E.M. (1998), "Interdependence, Punitive 
Capability, and the Reciprocation of Punitive Actions in Channel Relationships," 
Journal of Marketing Research, 35, 225-235. 
Lamming, R. (1993), Beyond Partnership, New York: Prentice Hall. 
Lewicki, R.J. and B.B. Bunker (1996), 'Developing and maintaining trust in work 
relationships', in R.M. Kramer and T.R. Tyler (eds), Trust in organizations: Frontiers 
of theory and research, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications: 114-139. 
Levy, D.T. (1984), "The Transaction Cost Approach to Vertical Integration: An Empirical 
Examination," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 438-445. 
 19
Lippman, S. and Rumelt, R.P. (1982), "Uncertain Imitability: An Analysis of Interfirm 
Differences in Efficiency Under Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 418-
438. 
Macauley, S. (1963), "Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study", American 
Sociological Review, 28, 55-67. 
Macneil, I.R. (1974). "The Many Futures of Contracts," Southern California Law Review, 47 
(May), 691-816. 
Monteverde, K. and Teece, D.J. (1982), "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration 
in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, 13, 206-213. 
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., and Deshpandé, R. (1992), "Relationships Between Providers and 
Users of Marketing Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and Between 
Organizations," Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 314-329. 
Morgan, R.M. and Hunt, S.D. (1994), "The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship 
Marketing," Journal of Marketing, 58, 20-38. 
Nishiguchi, T. (1994), Strategic Industrial Sourcing. The Japanese Advantage. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Noorderhaven, N.G., B. Nooteboom, and Berger, H. (1998), "Determinants of Perceived 
Interfirm Dependence in Industrial Supplier Relations," Journal of Management and 
Governance, 2, 213-232. 
Nooteboom, B. (1992), "Towards a Dynamic Theory of Transactions," Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 2, 281-299. 
Nooteboom, B. (1996), "Trust, Opportunism and Governance: a Process and Control Model," 
Organization Studies, 17, 985-1010. 
Nooteboom, B. (1998), "Cost, Quality and Learning Based Governance of Buyer-Supplier 
Relations", in M.G. Colombo (ed.), "The Changing Boundaries of the Firm," 
London: Routledge: 187-208. 
Nooteboom, B. (1999), Inter-firm alliances: Analysis and design, London: Routledge. 
Nooteboom. B. (2000), Learning and innovation in organizations and economies, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nooteboom, B. (2002), Trust: forms, foundations, functions, failures and figures, Cheltenham 
UK: Edward Elgar, forthcoming. 
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., and Noorderhaven, N.G., (1997), "Effects of Trust and 
Governance on Relational Risk," Academy of Management Journal, 40, 308-338. 
Parkhe, A. (1993), "Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and Transaction Cost 
Examination of Interfirm Co-operation," Academy of Management Journal, 36, 794-
829. 
Ring, P.S. and Van de Ven, A.H. (1994), "Developmental Processes of Co-operative 
Interorganizational Relationships," Academy of Management Review, 19, 90-118. 
Sako, M. (1992), Prices, Quality, and Trust: Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Japan, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smircich, L. (1983). 'Organization as shared meaning', in L. R. Pondy, P. J. Frost, G. Morgan 
and T. C. Dandridge (eds.), Organizational symbolism, Greenwich Conn: JAI Press, 
55 - 65. 
Walker, G. and Weber, D. (1984), "A Transaction Cost Approach to Make Versus Buy 
Decision," Administrative Science Quarterly, 29, 373-391. 
Weick, K. F. (1979), The social psychology of organizing, Reading, MA: Addison - Wesley. 
Weick, K.F. (1995), Sensemaking in organisations, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985), Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1993), "Calculativeness, trust and economic organization", Journal of Law 
and Economics, 36, 453 - 86. 
Williamson, O.E. (1999). "Strategy research: Governance and competence perspectives", 
Strategic Management Journal, 20, 1087-1108.  
 20
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., and Roos, D. (1990), The Machine that Changed the World, New 
York: Rawson Associates. 
Zaheer, A. and Venkatraman, N. (1995), "Relational Governance as an Interorganizational 
Strategy: An Empirical Test of the Role of Trust in Economic Exchange," Strategic  
 Management Journal, 16, 373-392. 
Zand, D.E. (1972), 'Trust and managerial problem solving', Administrative Science Quarterly, 
17/2: 229 - 239. 
 
 21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLES, FIGURES AND APPENDICES  
 
Table 1 Overview of the hypotheses 
 
No. 
(1) 
From Variable 
(2) 
Sign 
(3) 
To Variable 
(4) 
I Dedicated Investments    
H1A Supplier’s dedicated investments + Supplier’s dependence 
H1B Supplier’s future perspectives + Supplier’s dedicated investments 
H1C Customer’s value to supplier + Supplier’s dedicated investments 
II Value of the Partner    
H2A Supplier’s dedicated investments + Supplier’s value to the customer 
H2B Supplier’s value to the customer + Customer’s dependence 
III Commitment    
H3A Customer’s dependence + Customer’s commitment 
H3B Customer’s commitment + Customer’s value to the supplier 
H3C Customer’s commitment + Supplier’s future perspectives 
IV Uncertainty    
H4A Customer’s commitment – Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance 
H4B Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance – Supplier’s dedicated investments 
H4C Supplier’s dependence + Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance 
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Figure 1 The causality of supply relationships 
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Table 2 United States, Japan and Europe: measurement of constructsa 
No. Construct Item USA Japan Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
01 Supplier's Dependence SD1 .36 (4.25) .32 (2.74) .31 (2.36)
SD2 .41 (6.12) .34 (2.91) .57 (5.24)
SD3 .65 (7.48) .59 (3.86) .67 (5.56)
SD4 .38 (5.83) .39 (3.24) .34 (3.84)
02 Customer's Dependence CD1 .56 (10.18) .43 (5.50) .42 (3.72)
CD2 .56 (10.18) .43 (5.50) .42 (3.72)
03 Supplier's Value
  Relative Skills .49 (2.52) .73 (3.46) .32 (2.03)
SV1 .63 (8.71) .70 (6.23) .70 (6.23)
SV2 .78 (9.40) .95 (6.49) .95 (6.49)
SV3 .91 (9.67) .91 (6.49) .91 (6.49)
  Technical Competencies .41 (2.32) .48 (2.68) .41 (2.11)
SV4 .43 (4.96) .35 (3.92) .35 (3.92)
SV5 .42 (4.94) .98 (3.12) .98 (3.12)
  Innovative Capabilities .57 (2.24) .50 (4.34) .38 (2.09)
SV6 .58 (5.62) .35 (5.39) .35 (5.39)
SV7 .44 (5.19) .58 (7.47) .58 (7.47)
SV8 .67 (5.64) .59 (7.48) .59 (7.48)
04 Customer's Value CV1 .42 (7.86) .39 (3.79) .35 (3.64)
CV2 .39 (7.36) .68 (4.45) .35 (3.71)
CV3 .67 (11.49) .42 (4.16) .55 (4.99)
CV4 .58 (10.64) .44 (5.33) .50 (4.74)
05 Customer's Commitment CC1 .83 (14.69) .47 (6.67) .47 (3.89)
CC2 .48 (9.07) .49 (6.87) .32 (2.94)
CC3 .46 (8.69) .30 (4.56) .35 (3.19)
CC4 .58 (10.96) .50 (6.96) .55 (4.21)
06 Supplier's Uncertainty SUA1 .67 (14.60) .84 (20.64) .73 (11.04)
Avoidance SUA2 .67 (14.60) .84 (20.64) .73 (11.04)  
 
a Factor-loadings for measurement models –including t-values in brackets– obtained with 
LISREL. 
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Table 3 United States, Japan and Europe: mean values for constructs 
No Construct USA Japan Europe
(n=553) (n=450) (n=226)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 14,10 5,92 16,48
02 Supplier's dependence 10,49 11,34 10,57
03 Customer's dependence 8,09 8,21 8,28
04 Supplier's value to customer 25,02 23,41 25,66
05 Customer's value to the supplier 11,22 12,80 11,13
06 Customer's commitment 10,89 11,49 13,77
07 Supplier's future perspectives 7,93 25,37 17,69
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance 0,44 1,08 0,38  
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 Figure 2 United States: testing the hypotheses (n=553)a 
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Figure 3 Japan: testing the hypotheses (n=450)a 
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Figure 4 Europe: testing the hypotheses (n=226)a 
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Table 4 Summary of the results for the US, Japan, and Europea  
 
 
Hypothesis U.S. Hyp. Japan Hyp. Europe Hyp.
(t-value) Conf. (t-value) Conf. (t-value) Conf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
I Dedicated Investments
Hypothesis 1A: + .31† yes .34† yes .29† yes
(7.90) (6.21) (3.75)
Hypothesis 1B: + .07* yes .11† yes .03 no
(1.60) (2.77) (0.45)
Hypothesis 1C: + .11† yes -.03 no -.05 no
(2.56) (-.82) (-.52)
II Value of the Partner
Hypothesis 2A: + .27† yes .29† yes .19† yes
(6.68) (6.34) (2.92)
Hypothesis 2B: + .25† yes .15† yes .19† yes
(5.95) (3.33) (2.95)
III Commitment
Hypothesis 3A: + .14† yes .12† yes .12** yes
(3.37) (2.57) (1.83)
Hypothesis 3B: + .35† yes .21† yes .16† yes
(8.78) (4.44) (2.38)
Hypothesis 3C: + .18† yes .09** yes .16† yes
(4.22) (1.96) (2.43)
IV Uncertainty
Hypothesis 4A: - -.06* yes -.06 no -.16† yes
(-1.43) (-1.17) (-2.35)
Hypothesis 4B: - -.22† yes -.52† yes -.51† yes
(-4.86) (-11.57) (-8.25)
Hypothesis 4C: + .15† yes .14** yes .13* yes
(3.19) (2.28) (1.55)
Model Fit
N 553 450 226
GFI .98 .97 .97
AGFI .95 .94 .93
RMSEA .07 .07 .06  
 
a † p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 
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Appendix A Detailed Specification of Constructs, Items and Scales 
 
1 Supplier’s dedicated investments SUPINV 
Please estimate the total amount of your business unit’s investment in equipment to make this 
product for this customer over the last four years. 
Scale: the amount of investments (in log) 
 
2 Supplier’s dependence SUPDEP 
SD1 If you were to stop getting these orders from this customer, approximately how much 
of your investment for this product in plant, equipment, and training would you be 
unlikely to find alternative uses for and have to write off?  
Scale: 1 = 10% or less; 2 = 11-33%; 3 = 34-66%; 4 = 67-89%; 5 = 90-100%. 
SD2 Please estimate the technical complexity involved in manufacturing the product in 
1992. 
Scale: 1 = fairly simple; 5 = highly complex. 
SD3 Please check the appropriate range for the average piece price of the product in 1992. 
Scale: 1 = <$1; 2 = $1-10; 3 = $11-50; 4 = $51-100; 5 = > $100. 
SD4 Does your business unit have any of the following? 
A marketing office near your customer; a design office near your customer; a facility 
near your customer to consolidate shipments of your parts for ‘Just-in-Time’ (JIT) 
delivery; an engineers resident at your customer's facility. 
Scale: one point for each. 
 
3 Customer’s Dependence CUSDEP 
CD1 Please estimate the number of months it would take your customer to replace your 
business unit with another supplier. Consider the time required to locate, qualify, train, make 
investments, test, and develop a working relationship with another firm. Please exclude legal 
considerations such as the existence of long-term contracts. 
Scale: 1 = 0; 2 = 1-3; 3 = 4-12; 4 = 13-24; 5 = 25-48; 6 = > 48. 
CD2 What percent of your business unit’s sales ends up as original equipment for cars or 
light trucks? 
Scale: 1 = 0-10; 2 = 11-25; 3 = 26-40; 4 = 41-65; 5 = 66-80; 6 = 81-100. 
 
4 Supplier’s value to the customer SUPVAL 
SV1 For design engineering. Currently, how would you rate your business unit's skills at 
making modifications to products or processes? Please compare yourself to other firms in 
your industry throughout the world.  
Scale: 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average. 
SV2 For making incremental process improvements. Currently, how would you rate your 
business unit's skills at making modifications to products or processes? Please compare 
yourself to other firms in your industry throughout the world.  
Scale: 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average. 
SV3 For implementing entirely new processes. Currently, how would you rate your 
business unit's skills at making modifications to products or processes? Please compare 
yourself to other firms in your industry throughout the world.  
Scale: 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average. 
SV4 Of the metal cutting machines currently in use at the plant which makes this product, 
about what percent are CNC?  
Scale: 1 = 0%; 2 = 1-25%; 3 = 26-50%; 4 = 51-75%; 5 = 76-100%. 
SV5 About how many robots (programmable machines with at least three axes of 
movement) are in use at the plant? 
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Scale: 1 = 0; 2 = 1-2; 3 = 3-5; 4 = 6-10; 5 = >10. 
SV6 Approximately what percent of the contacts with your customer regarding this 
product were for ‘your business unit providing technical assistance to customer’? 
Scale: 1 = 0-19; 2 = 20-39; 3 = 40-59; 4 = 60-79; 5 = 80-100. 
SV7 Which range best describes your business unit’s R&D as a percent of sales? 
Scale: 1 = 0%; 2 = 0.1-1%; 3 = 1.1-2%; 4 = 2.1-4%; 5 = >4%. 
SV8 Please check the descriptions which apply to the product development process for 
your company’s product. 
Scale: 1 = customer took entire responsibility; 2 = customer provided majority of 
engineering hours; your business unit provided the rest; 3 = customer and your 
business unit contributed equally to the design; 4 = your business unit provided 
majority of engineering hours; 5 = your business unit took entire responsibility. 
 
5 Customer’s value to the supplier CUSVAL 
CV1 Over the last four years, what sorts of technical assistance have you received from 
your customer?  
Provided personnel who visited your site to aid in implementing improved procedures 
for zero or a nominal charge; for a fee; did not provide. Arranged for training of your 
personnel at their site for zero or a nominal charge; for a fee; did not provide. Provided 
personnel who worked two weeks or more on your shop floor to improve your 
processes for zero or a nominal charge; for a fee; did not provide. 
Scale: one point for each. 
CV2 Approximately what percent of the contacts with your customer regarding this 
product were for ‘customer providing technical assistance to your business unit’? 
Scale: 1 = 0; 2 = 1-10; 3 = 11-20; 4 = 21-30; 5 = 31-100. 
CV3 The advice our customer gives us is not always helpful.  
Scale: 1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree.  
CV4 In dealing with this customer, we have learned much that will help us with other 
customers.  
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. 
 
6 Customer’s Commitment CUSCOM 
CC1 How would your customer react if one of your competitors offered a lower price for a 
product of equal quality? 
Scale: 1 = switch to competitor as soon as technical feasible; 2 = switch at end of 
contract; 3 = reduce your market share; 5 = help you match your competitors’ efforts.  
CC2 How would your customer react if your material suppliers raised their prices? 
Scale: 1 = reduce your business unit’s market share or switch to another supplier at end 
of contract; 2 = hold you to your original price; 3 = allow partial pass-through of your 
business unit’s cost increases; 4 = allow full pass-through of your business unit’s 
increases in out-of-pocket costs; 5 = provide significant help for your business unit to 
reduce costs. 
CC3 Suppose your business unit had an idea that would allow you to reduce your costs, 
but would require your customer to make a slight modification in its procedures. How would 
your customer react? 
Scale: 1 = customer does not welcome suggestions that would require modifications in 
its procedures; 2 = customer would adopt the suggestion, but would seek to capture 
most of the savings; 3 = customer would adopt the suggestion, but would seek to 
capture some of the savings; 5 = customer would eagerly solicits such suggestions. 
CC4 We can rely on our customer to help us in ways not required by our agreement with 
them. 
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree. 
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7 Supplier’s future perspectives SUPFUT 
For how long do you think there is a high probability that your business unit will be 
supplying this or a similar item to your customer (in years)? 
Scale: the number of years. 
 
8 Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance SUPUNC 
SUA1 If our customer had given us less assurance of continued business for this product, we 
would definitely have invested less in plant, equipment, and training which could be 
used to serve only this customer 
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree 
SUA2 If our customer had given us less assurance of continued business for this product, 
we would definitely have invested less in plant, equipment, and training which could be used 
to serve either this customer or other customers.  
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree 
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Appendix B Summary Statistics 
 
 
Table B.1 United States: summary statistics (n=553) 
No Construct Mean St. D. Minim. Maxim. Skewn.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 14,10 3,62 0,00 20,72 -2,39
02 Supplier's dependence 10,49 2,54 4,00 17,00 0,07
03 Customer's dependence 8,09 2,08 2,00 12,00 -0,73
04 Supplier's value to customer 25,02 4,77 12,00 39,00 0,06
05 Customer's value to the supplier 11,22 3,22 4,00 19,00 0,01
06 Customer's commitment 10,89 2,94 4,00 18,00 -0,04
07 Supplier's future perspectives 7,93 5,77 0,00 50,00 2,43
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance 0,44 0,15 0,11 0,83 0,11  
 
 
Table B.2 Japan: summary statistics (n=450) 
No Construct Mean St. D. Minim. Maxim. Skewn.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 5,92 2,03 0,00 11,51 -0,69
02 Supplier's dependence 11,34 2,46 5,00 18,00 -0,01
03 Customer's dependence 8,21 1,91 2,00 12,00 -0,65
04 Supplier's value to customer 23,41 4,09 11,00 36,00 0,05
05 Customer's value to the supplier 12,80 2,26 5,00 19,00 0,06
06 Customer's commitment 11,49 2,25 5,00 20,00 0,32
07 Supplier's future perspectives 25,37 29,09 0,00 100,00 1,85
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance 1,08 0,55 0,19 3,47 0,94  
 
 
Table B.3 Europe: summary statistics (n=226) 
No Construct Mean St. D. Minim. Maxim. Skewn.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 16,48 3,26 6,91 23,72 -0,04
02 Supplier's dependence 10,57 2,65 5,00 18,00 0,36
03 Customer's dependence 8,28 1,79 3,00 12,00 -0,78
04 Supplier's value to customer 25,66 4,16 13,00 40,00 0,03
05 Customer's value to the supplier 11,13 2,76 4,00 17,00 0,02
06 Customer's commitment 13,77 2,84 4,00 20,00 -0,42
07 Supplier's future perspectives 17,69 29,84 0,00 100,00 2,30
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance 0,38 0,15 0,10 0,87 0,49  
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Table B4 United States: correlation matrix (n=553)a 
No Construct 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 0
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 1,00
02 Supplier's dependence 0,35 * 1,00
03 Customer's dependence 0,20 * 0,40 ^ 1,00
04 Supplier's value to the customer 0,27 0,34 * 0,25 * 1,00
05 Customer's value to the supplier 0,11 0,10 0,13 * 0,10 1,00
06 Customer's commitment 0,01 0,04 * 0,15 * 0,06 0,35 1,00
07 Supplier's future perspectives 0,08 0,10 * 0,15 * 0,08 0,07 0,18 1,00
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance -0,17 0,08 * 0,03 -0,02 0,03 -0,06 -0,02 1,00
8
 
 
Table B5 Japan: correlation matrix (n=450)a 
No Construct 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 0
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 1,00
02 Supplier's dependence 0,28 * 1,00
03 Customer's dependence 0,20 * 0,34 ^ 1,00
04 Supplier's value to the customer 0,29 0,21 * 0,21 * 1,00
05 Customer's value to the supplier -0,03 0,11 * 0,06 * -0,03 1,00
06 Customer's commitment -0,01 0,05 * 0,13 * 0,01 0,20 1,00
07 Supplier's future perspectives 0,15 0,09 * 0,12 * 0,17 0,09 0,09 1,00
08 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance -0,49 -0,05 * -0,02 * -0,23 0,01 -0,06 -0,08 1,00
8
 
 
Table B6 Europe: correlation matrix (n=226)a 
No Construct 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 0
01 Supplier's dedicated investments 1,00
02 Supplier's dependence 0,23 * 1,00
03 Customer's dependence 0,11 * 0,19 ^ 1,00
04 Supplier's value to the customer 0,19 0,25 * 0,19 * 1,00
05 Customer's value to the supplier -0,05 * -0,01 ^ 0,13 ^ 0.01 * 1,00
06 Customer's commitment -0,12 0,09 * 0,12 * -0,15 0,16 * 1,00
07 Supplier's future perspectives 0,01 0,06 * 0,06 * 0,04 0,04 * 0,16 1,00
08 Su
8
pplier's uncertainty avoidance -0,48 -0,01 * 0,01 * -0,07 0,01 * -0,17 0,02 1,00  
 
a Pearson correlation coefficients except for * which are polyserial and ^ which are 
polychoric correlation coefficients. 
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